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Abstract. Political theorizing about armed humanitarian intervention has been 
dominated by liberalism. Contemporary liberal political theorists broadly agree 
about the right, if not the duty, of intervention in at least grave cases of human 
rights violation. This essay argues that the liberal case for humanitarian 
intervention, despite its secular outlook, features a religious dimension: it 
tacitly relies on a particular Christian understanding of politics. The argument 
of this essay is twofold. First, the liberal argument for humanitarian 
intervention is “actively Christian”: it implicitly assumes that political leaders 
perform normative “Christian prudence” instead of “secular prudence” - more 
specifically, “higher prudence” rather than “lower prudence”. Second, the 
liberal interventionist ideal is “Roman”: it entails a further secularized 
continuation of the “Roman” tradition as opposed to the “Protestant” one 
within Christian intellectual thought. The religious dimension of the liberal case 
for humanitarian intervention may be aptly characterized as 
“progressivistically Roman”. 
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As with fighting global poverty, inequality, and climate change, political 
theorizing about humanitarian intervention – military interference by an 
outside power for the primary purpose of protecting civilians of a particular 
state – has been dominated by a secular liberalism. At the core of the 
humanitarian intervention debate lies the tension between the principle of state 
sovereignty and the evolving norms concerning individual human rights. Until 
the 1970s, liberal political theory usually defended the view that states are like 
individual persons in having rights of autonomy, and therefore are entitled to 
sovereignty and non-intervention. However, contemporary liberal theorists, 
while they disagree about whether principles of global distributive justice are 
called for, are in broad agreement about the right, if not the duty, of 
intervention in at least grave cases of human rights violation (Walzer 2004c, cf. 
2006; Rawls 1999; Beitz 1999; Téson 2003) - provided intervention achieves the 
best possible human rights outcome (cf. Heinze 2009). Today, the liberal 
standard assumption is that states should secure basic human rights, and that 
their sovereignty is at most of instrumental, certainly not of intrinsic, value1. 
                                                          
1 A qualification seems in order. While liberalism is grounded in the demand for a substantial 
domain of personal freedom that the state (or any other political institution) ought not to violate 
except to protect others from harm, various liberalisms have come into existence. One 
important distinction often made is between “Anglo-American” and “Continental” liberalism. 
The latter position, with Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek as a key figure, insists on 
economic freedom. The state should facilitate economic activity, but should not intervene in the 
free market to promote some desired outcome or “distributive justice”, as that would involve 
improper interference with personal freedom and, as a centrally planned activity, cannot but 
fail. Anglo-American liberalism, of which John Rawls is a leading theorist, rejects such 
“libertarianism”, arguing that (economic) freedom may have to be limited somewhat for the 
purpose of equality. Political intervention may be called for to “correct” the operations of the 
free market in order to create more just outcomes, notably for worse-off members of society 
(Brown 2007: 151-155, cf. 165). Thus, the secular liberal case for humanitarian intervention 
(which broadly unites “communitarian” or “pluralist” liberals and “cosmopolitanist” liberals 
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In this essay, I argue that the liberal case for humanitarian intervention, 
despite its secular (non-religious) outlook, features a religious dimension: it 
tacitly relies on a particular Christian understanding of politics. At first glance, 
liberals may seem to have good reasons for denying the relevance of religion for 
their case. Thus, first, it seems clear that humanitarian intervention is a 
“fundamentally liberal enterprise” rooted in Enlightenment and modernity 
(Bass 2008: 7-8). Second, experts such as Martha Finnemore (2003) and Gary 
Bass (2008), while they disagree about whether nineteenth-century 
humanitarian intervention is to be understood in terms of either pan-Christian 
loyalties (Finnemore) or non-Christianized humanitarianism (Bass), agree that 
the scope of contemporary humanitarian intervention includes non-Western 
and non-Christian populations, too. The international norm now is that all 
humans, whatever their worldviews or further characteristics, possess 
inalienable human rights that should be protected. This is most visibly the case 
after the end of the Cold War, as the interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Liberia, and Macedonia demonstrate. Third, arguments such as 
Brian Lepard‟s (2002) that the revered texts of world religions (including 
Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Islam) all 
advocate human rights and humanitarian intervention seem more pragmatic 
than substantive, and may be criticized for employing selective reading 
(underlining “pro-rights” passages, while ignoring or downplaying “anti-
rights” passages), as humanitarian intervention is never directly addressed in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
to be examined in this essay originates from the Anglo-American liberal tradition, which has 
come to prevail in international political theory. It may still be noted that not all Anglo-
American philosophers somehow sympathetic to liberalism would endorse the progressive, 
left-wing outlook of the Anglo-American variant. To mention but one example: conservative 
thinker Michael Oakeshott (whose thought is religious rather than rationalist) would 
presumably, more or less like Hayek, have defended a “skeptical liberalism” of limits on power 
and ambitions, low expectations, and order maintenance instead of a liberalism of justice and 
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these texts. And yet, my claim is that the liberal political-theoretical defense of 
humanitarian intervention depends on - and so cannot work without - certain 
beliefs or value systems regarding what is ultimate (unconditioned, uncaused, 
pre-political) and thus is not religion-free at all2. Such an outcome may shed 
new light on both the modern humanitarian intervention debate and liberal 
political theory. Even leading liberals such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, 
who have come to give significant room for religion in their political thought, 
have persisted in keeping their theoretical attitudes secular in the sense of 
religion-independent. However, at least with humanitarian intervention, 
liberalism may be truly religion-reliant, or at any rate much more so than liberal 
political theorists recognize3. 
The independent strength of the liberal analysis of (international) 
political issues lies in its “technical” capacity to supply justification, clarity, and 
precision to the use of moral concepts such as rights, obligations or duties, and 
justice (cf. Kamminga 2007). Yet, as regards humanitarian intervention as I aim 
to show, from the point at which we must move from abstract ethics into 
                                                          
2 For this understanding of religion compare Philpott (2002: 68). 
3 Rawls‟s political philosophy was driven by a deeply religious temperament (Nagel 2009). And 
as a political, not comprehensive, liberal theorist, Rawls allowed religious arguments in the 
public sphere. Yet he maintained that, under pluralistic conditions, realistic justifications of 
laws and policies require that religious arguments be complemented, sooner or later, by non-
religious, neutrally secular reasons (Rawls 1999: 144, 152). Habermas, an atheist who signals the 
impact of Judaism and Christianity on modern ideals of freedom and justice (and a European 
philosopher who has attempted to bridge critical theory and Anglo-American liberalism), 
criticizes Rawls for saddling up religious communities with the hard task of translating their 
religion-based moral beliefs into a secular moral vocabulary suitable for modern pluralism, 
which puts them in an unequal position compared to non-theists who are able to employ a 
native secular language. Yet he remains a dedicated secular theorist who is vigilant about non-
translated religious arguments in the public domain, particularly at the level of formal 
governance, and merely tries to redress the imbalance by requiring that non-religious citizens 
cooperate with religious citizens in the task of translation towards a “post-metaphysical” 
vocabulary (Habermas 2006; cf. Hannan 2009). At its core, the theory of “secular liberalism”, also 
when addressing the issue of humanitarian intervention (cf. Kreide 2009 for both Rawls and 
Habermas), embraces morality and appeals to ethics, but avoids religion in its political 
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political ethics - which includes moral reflection on authority4, leadership 
responsibility, and military obligation (cf. Gaskarth 2011), and analysis of 
moral-political ideals - the religious input is not to be overlooked. I offer a 
twofold argument. First, the liberal argument for humanitarian intervention is 
“actively Christian”: it implicitly assumes that political leaders perform 
normative “Christian prudence” instead of “secular prudence” – more 
specifically, “higher prudence” rather than “lower prudence”. Second, the 
liberal interventionist ideal is “Roman”: it entails a further secularized 
continuation of the “Roman” tradition as opposed to the “Protestant” one 
within Christian intellectual thought. Taken together, these arguments suggest 
that the religious dimension of the liberal case for humanitarian intervention is 
to be characterized as “progressivistically Roman”. 
 
THE “ACTIVELY CHRISTIAN” CHARACTER OF THE 
LIBERAL INTERVENTION ARGUMENT 
Liberal political theorists believe that any state or political community rightly 
willing to undertake a humanitarian intervention should be prepared to risk the 
lives of its soldiers (Archibugi 2004: 11-12). “Soldiers are destined for dangerous 
places, and they should know that (if they don‟t, they should be told),” writes 
Michael Walzer (2004c: 73; cf. Tan 2006: 107-108). For liberals, a basic distinction 
between readiness to sacrifice oneself for national self-defense and willingness 
to die for the basic rights of “strangers” does not exist: “soldiers [should] risk 
their lives, first for their compatriots and then for the innocent members of 
other countries” (Walzer 2004b: 45). Liberals, then, have strongly criticized the 
intervention means applied in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, particularly the 
increasing reliance on air strikes, as these means suggest that Western 
                                                          
4 In the conclusion, I shall comment explicitly on the role of authority in humanitarian 
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governments value the lives of their soldiers and those of the civilians they 
purported to rescue differently. Thus, Walzer (2004a: 17) condemns “what 
NATO did in the Kosovo war, where its leaders declared in advance that they 
would not send ground forces into battle, whatever happened inside Kosovo 
once the air war began”. Without political leaders‟ willingness to put soldiers at 
risk in faraway places when their own country is not under attack and when 
national interests, narrowly understood, are not at stake, humanitarian 
intervention, although justified, will often be impossible. It is the purpose of 
this section to show that this position of liberal theorists makes sense only if its 
reliance on Christian prudence, notably higher prudence, is acknowledged. 
Liberals themselves have realized that their stance needs further defense. 
Even when “external” justifications in terms of justice and necessity exist, the 
more “internal” question that remains is how leaders could justify to their 
soldiers that they will be sent abroad on humanitarian missions. Thus, Walzer 
(2004c: 74) answers that “all states have an interest in global stability and even 
global humanity”, and that if one remains insensitive, one “will soon have to 
pay the political price of turmoil and lawlessness nearer home”. Fernando 
Téson (2003: 126-127) offers the “important qualification” that the government 
must send voluntary soldiers before resorting to conscription, because, as 
contract draftees, “[v]oluntary soldiers have validly consented to fight in cases 
where the legitimate government believes there is (a morally) sufficient reason 
(apart from consent) to fight”. James Pattison (2010: 110) argues that it is only 
regular, volunteer soldiers that can be justifiably used for humanitarian 
intervention: “the soldier-state contract is not limited to defense of a state‟s vital 
interests. A soldier can expect when signing up that they will take part in 
humanitarian and peace operations, given the frequency of such operations” 
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However, such arguments seem to overstretch the liberal position. Note 
first that the issue that needs addressing is what motivational rationale should 
bring state leaders to exercise a right to humanitarian intervention by 
employing military forces. In wars of self-defense or strong political interests 
related to international order, this motivation is more or less self-evident: self-
protection. However, (authentic) humanitarian interventions have other-
regarding, altruistic motives: the defense of human rights elsewhere. Whereas 
in the first set of cases a state takes on enormous financial, cultural, and bodily 
dangers to defend its own interests (directly or indirectly), in humanitarian 
interventions it assumes such risks in order to help others (Miller 2000: 16; 
Achterhuis 1999: 55). Thus, as Richard Miller (2000: 16) writes, “[t]he politics of 
self-defense and the politics of rescue appear to derive from different 
wellsprings of action”, as “[i]t is much more difficult for a political leader to ask 
citizens to risk their lives to address other countries‟ needs than it is to rally 
troops for a national emergency”. Peaceful citizens of democratic countries, 
even when moved by compassion and shocked by atrocities, are reluctant to 
wage war for others (ibi: 16-17). 
Trying, then, to bridge the motivational gap by appealing to indirect self-
defense, which is what Walzer does, is unconvincing. As Miller argues, this 
argument is too abstract and empirically unstable to provide sufficient basis for 
countries with interventional power to assume risks for the sake of rescue in 
peripheral regions, that is, the world‟s most vulnerable regions, in which 
countries cannot rely on a strong ally or immediate neighbor (ibi.: 17-19)5. 
                                                          
5 Thus, more concretely, “indirect self-defense” offers no real incentive for the United States or 
other NATO member states to undertake other-regarding, military risky interventions in 
African countries torn by humanitarian disaster and in lack of protection, as it is hard to 
imagine how conflict in countries such as Somalia or Rwanda could ever create serious danger 
to America or Europe. Consequently, Walzer‟s “division of labor” proposal, grounded in a 
notion of special regional responsibility, also falls short. Writing in 1994, he suggested the 
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Clearly, attempting to render this argument more positively as one of indirect 
self-benefit (more future welfare for ourselves because of the world having 
become a safer and more just place) does not really help to eliminate this 
serious problem. In its reliance on promise, or hope, “indirect self-benefit” 
remains too vague a basis for asking individuals to risk their lives for 
humanitarian causes (cf. ibi.: 21-24)6. Thus, Walzer‟s argument might support 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the Organization of African Unity should have intervened in Rwanda; and the United States 
(with Central American and Caribbean states) should have intervened in Haiti (Walzer 2004c: 
79). Problematic for this position is that even within a region human rights violations in one 
area need not necessarily endanger or affect the interests of another (note that Walzer, who 
combines liberalism with communitarianism and stresses “thick” national identities, does not 
appear able, and is presumably not even willing, to demonstrate the existence of strong regional 
identities, not even of a European identity). But moreover, it remains the case that some regions 
and their populations - again, Africa comes to mind - are left at serious risk thereby when facing 
a humanitarian crisis. Their only hope for rescue is contingent on contiguous states, which may 
(and often will) be military or politically weak and lack adequate resources for intervention 
(Miller 2000: 18; Rieff 1999: 8). Further, Walzer acknowledges that his position makes it hard to 
tell who was responsible for stopping the killing in southern Sudan or East Timor. He argues 
that, in cases of unclear responsibility, the United States should pursue military initiatives or, if 
possible, should stimulate other states to take action (Walzer 2004c: 79-80). However, it is by no 
means clear what long-term national interests should make the United States act in one of these 
ways (Miller 2000: 18; cf. Kamminga 2002: 87-88). 
6 Note that the argument of indirect self-defense or benefit cannot be improved by pointing out 
that humanitarian intervention may help the intervening power to attain or strengthen a 
condition of hegemony. Now it cannot be excluded that the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo 
have resulted in an enhancement, however marginally, of the hegemony of the United States 
(cf. Reiff 1999: 10). Yet such an argumentation strategy would fail for at least two reasons. First, 
it is questionable whether humanitarian intervention in vulnerable, marginalized (rather 
“insignificant”) regions would indeed promote (Western or American) imperial dominance, 
and even if it did, whether the gain in this respect would be such that it could justify the cost of 
putting the lives of soldiers at risk. Again, particular world regions would face the prospect of 
being left without outside help when experiencing a humanitarian disaster. Second, more 
fundamentally, the very logic of hegemony seems incompatible with (genuine) humanitarian 
interventions. If a state aims at hegemony for itself – a goal that seems devoid of moral 
considerations and may easily have immoral consequences – then it is hard to see why it would 
ever intervene militarily in conflict-ridden regions for primarily altruistic reasons. Indeed, one 
would then rather foresee that state to employ moral rhetoric as a cover-up for its interest in 
promoting its hegemony (for a pro-humanitarian intervention argument that even leftists 
should not worry too much about the danger of American “humanitarian imperialism”, see Van 
der Linden 2006). Thus, it would be illogical, if not inappropriate, for a liberal political theorist 
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NATO‟s current war against Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in 
Afghanistan, but it does not apply to humanitarian intervention. 
Next, the “voluntary contractor” (set of) argument(s), while not wholly 
implausible, is inconclusive. First, this argument largely, and ironically, 
excludes humanitarian intervention by countries that happen to have no 
voluntary soldiers available. Second, more important, this argument is juridical 
rather than (political-)ethical. It does not offer adequate moral guidance to the 
political leader for whom the use of military means for protection of 
humanitarian values will be much less absolute than its use for protection of 
national security. The “body bags argument” weighs heavily in humanitarian 
interventions, much more so than when protecting one‟s own territory. And it 
does not sufficiently guide the military person, giving no satisfactory reason 
why to expect him or her to exchange a patriotic, concrete, and bounded 
motivation for a more universalistic, principally endless and distant, 
psychologically (even) more straining, one. Pointing to the voluntariness of 
contract signing does not show that the vital identification is conceptually and 
emotionally not only possible on the nation-state level, but also on the level of a 
“world political community”. The liberal case does not do full justice to the 
following “humanitarian paradox”: Western soldiers will encounter fighters 
who, fueled by ideology, nationalism, ethnicity, tribalism, or religious 
fundamentalism, are willing to go into the extreme, while they themselves can 
hardly see the conflicts in which they come to find themselves as worth dying 
for (Christ Klep, cited in Achterhuis 1999: 55). 
If indeed such arguments fail, it would seem that liberals must 
acknowledge that military persons have no moral obligation to participate in 
humanitarian intervention, but have a supererogatory duty at most: 
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that, as James Fishkin (1982: 70) states, “[w]e cannot [by some ethical theory] be 
morally required to be heroes…[S]uch a conclusion is an indication that 
something has gone wrong” (emphasis in original). Insofar as a strategic 
necessity exists for employing ground troops, or at least not to exclude this 
option, the problem is that military persons may refuse to risk their lives for 
humanitarian, thus non-traditional, policy goals (Kamminga 2002: 88-90). On 
this basis, leaders‟ basic attitude would be that military personnel “may accept 
[humanitarian] deployments in the name of the ideals of international 
community, but only to a certain (and rather low) threshold of pain” (Cook 
2003: 151). Since, then, the (internal) question about the duty to ultimate 
assistance lacks a satisfactory liberal answer, it makes sense to see if the liberal 
case for humanitarian intervention actually relies on some outside factor. 
What liberal political theorists neglect, and seem unable to comprehend 
in their own terms, is that their argument for humanitarian intervention entails 
a case for a (far-reaching) form of policy, not merely for some (well-articulated) 
principle of justice. But, as James Gustafson (1996) has argued, “policy” should 
assume the position of moral responsibility and so cannot be solely determined 
by ethical principles. Moral discourse about policy is distinct insofar as it needs 
to accept “the standpoint of persons who have institutional roles that require 
them to formulate policy within the limitations and possibilities of resources 
accessible to them” (ibi.: 53). Thus, to reflect adequately on political leaders‟ 
decision-making concerning sending soldiers to faraway places for 
humanitarian goals entails that considerations typical of responsible leadership 
are addressed as well. In order to do this - to take up the problem of 
“translating” ethical principles into a morally sound intervention policy - one 
must bring in the political-ethical concept of prudence, properly understood as 




Menno R. Kamminga 
37 
37 
and act in a non-ideological, other-regarding, and self-controlled way, with due 
regard for the friction of circumstances or “particulars” (Coll 1999; cf. 
Kamminga 2007: 434-437; Jackson 2004). Ironically, one major problem of 
secular liberalism, which tends to reduce the practical-political to the abstract-
moral and is rather silent about the conditions of leadership (cf. Brown 2002: 
184-185, particularly in the context of humanitarian intervention)7, is that it by 
itself lacks the resources to oppose the “prudence” of “secular realists”, such as 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, who treat politics and morality as 
basically divorced and prudence as the skill of distinguishing those actions that 
best serve one‟s self-interest. For all its moral force, and despite its political 
pretensions, by itself liberal theory is not obviously incompatible with an 
amoral political prudence that is narrowly instrumental and tends to equate 
prudence with “caution, stealth, and the successful quest for survival… of the 
self or a particular political community” by all necessary means (Coll 1999: 76-
77)8. However, a more original, religious prudence tradition – one that insists 
                                                          
7 Admittedly, as a just war theorist, Michael Walzer (notably 2006: 287-327) has discussed the 
question of (political) responsibility quite extensively. However, while it can be debated 
whether his reflections on this issue show sufficient awareness of the moral character of the 
leadership domain, what matters most here is that they fail to shed light on the specific 
responsibility that leaders face when considering sending soldiers abroad for humanitarian 
purposes and are of no help to liberal political theory in this regard. 
8 For a classic analysis of Hobbesian (and Machiavellian) amoral prudentialism in international 
relations, or “international skepticism”, see Beitz (1999: 13-66). Machiavelli regarded every 
political action directed at the power of the state as legitimate, even if it necessitates the use of 
immoral means. “[I]t is necessary to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able 
not to be good”, and “he is often under a necessity, to maintain his state, of acting against faith, 
against charity, against humanity, against religion” (Machiavelli 1998: 61, 70; cf. Coll 1999: 90, 
Achterhuis, 1999). As David Boucher (1998: 141, cf. 126, 136) comments, Machiavelli “is 
concerned only with the common good of the ruler‟s own state, and not with that of those states 
he conquers and subjects”, and attaches more weight to the power and glory of the ruler‟s own 
state than to balance of power and order with other states. Indeed, with the Renaissancist 
Machiavelli there was a first attempt to break radically with the Christian conception of 
prudence, particularly its “higher” version (see the text below), as Machiavelli‟s “post-
Christian” prudence idea entailed: “deprivation” of prudence of its intrinsic orientation 
towards ultimate ends, in favor of a total directedness towards proximate concerns; secular 
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on the final authority of the “ought” over the “is” in politics (ibi.: 75) – has the 
capacity to condemn secular prudence. In the wake of Thomas Aquinas, it 
could point out that such “prudence” is “false” for being rooted in “the sin of 
covetousness” (ibi.: 77, cf. Pieper 1965: 20-21). Most important here is that this 
tradition can explain why liberalism, if that is to have real political significance, 
is reliant on “normative prudence”, notably in a version that may accept 
exceptional risk-taking for humanitarian purposes. I now elaborate this. 
As Alberto Coll (1999) has explained, typical of “normative prudence”, 
which has deep roots in the Christian tradition, is its emphasis on the possibility 
of linking “morality” and “politics” by “seeking to bridge the treacherous gap 
between the necessities and inner logic of a fallen political world and the 
transcendent vision of the gospel” (ibi.: 78, 85, cf. also Carr 2001: 94-95). 
Christian thinkers have tried to lessen the tension between Jesus‟s “radical 
gospel”, with its “uncompromising” transcendental reference point, and the 
general tenor of political decision-making, which tends to take the “necessities” 
and “parameters” of this world for granted, by distinguishing two legitimate 
forms of Christian prudence. First, there is “lower prudence”, evident in the 
Old Testament, the Pauline letters, Augustine, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Lower 
prudence “is cautious…, defensive, focused on survival and 
respect…,…conservative and realistic[;] values…stability because it 
understands the fragility of order and the evils spawned by social chaos[;] 
recognizes the place of sin and self-interest[; and] is open to compromise” 
(Cochran 1983: 195). Second, there is “higher prudence”, which comes closest to 
the understanding of prudence in Aristotle, the Gospels, and Aquinas - with a 
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Christian scope more cosmopolitan than the Aristotelian one9. Higher 
prudence: 
 
is active, caring more for justice than survival and for love than respect[;] 
takes risks in the interest of realizing higher values[; and] follows the 
prophets in contending that the only genuine peace and stability are those 
founded on God‟s law; that is, on justice and mercy (ibi.: 195-196). 
 
While higher prudence “appreciates lower prudence” for its valuing of order 
against revolt and suspicion of ideology, it ardently aims to challenge injustice 
and oppression, exposing their ugliness, even if such an attack runs the risk of 
promoting a violent backlash; it is a “virtue infused with grace” (ibi.: 196). 
It seems, then, that secular liberalism, if indeed it insists on its case for 
humanitarian intervention and so has to bridge the gap between justice, or 
human rights, as a principle and intervention as a practical-political activity, 
needs to assume normative, Christian prudence - higher prudence in particular. 
To begin with, liberal political theorists must acknowledge that, as Christian 
prudence insists, at the core of political-ethical decision making, especially 
when considering the use of “living material”, is “a degree of existential agony 
and darkness perhaps indicative of man‟s finiteness and of his need for a 
transcendent grace” (Coll 1999: 97) that, as Niebuhr puts it, may “complete 
what even the highest human striving must leave incomplete”, since “faith in 
God‟s forgiveness” is what ultimately “makes possible the risk of action” 
(quoted in ibidem). The secular liberal defense of humanitarian intervention 
ultimately appeals to the capacity of state leaders, who have to make “the 
                                                          
9 As Coll (1999: 78-79) remarks, whereas Aristotle stressed “the ends of a well-ordered city-
state” as the standard for prudence, Aquinas believed one should broaden prudence to include 
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godlike consequentialist calculation” (Wheeler 2000: 51), to deal adequately 
with agony and consciences burdened with awkwardness. 
Next, concerning the higher-lower prudence distinction, with the liberal 
plea for (altruistic) humanitarian intervention we are clearly dealing with 
higher prudence, rather than lower prudence, in a cosmopolitan application (cf. 
Kamminga 2008)10. In the liberal case for intervention, global justice is the 
ultimate norm, which, if it is to have real practical meaning, presupposes that 
leaders will take radical action and significant risk for justice, if necessary at 
some cost of lower prudence values such as stability and self-interest. State 
leaders are asked to “make the agonizing decision that saving the lives of 
civilians beyond their own borders requires risking the lives of those who serve 
in the armed forces” (Wheeler 2000: 51). Indeed, liberal political theory 
implicitly requires that leaders follow the dictates of higher prudence by 
putting the lives of particular human beings - insofar as available, of course - at 
risk for saving the lives of complete strangers. It ultimately relies on a New 
Testament-like motivational rationale that it is not enough for the “steward” 
cautiously to protect the gifts of God (here, say, human dignity or justice at 
home); he or she must administer them so that they increase (human dignity 
not just at home but also abroad) – always a risky affair – with due regard to the 
lower prudence demand that the gifts entrusted are not squandered or invested 
in foolish and fruitless enterprises (Cochran 1983: 197-199). As liberalism must 
avoid the counterintuitive conclusion that leaders should be ready to treat 
soldiers “as if they are morally required to be heroes or saints” by 
demonstrating their willingness to give their lives for (total) strangers, it is 
bound to accept a religious context in which such universal solidarity seems 
                                                          
10 Cochran (1983: 198) himself applies higher prudence to the domestic issue of income support 
programs – which should be compassionate rather than abuse-free or efficient – and the 
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self-evident, while beyond the grasp of the liberal “contract” argument. Thus, 
liberals implicitly appeal to those religious traditions, such as Catholic social 
teaching, that make us, and our soldiers, see humanity as a genuine global 
community of solidarity, sister- and brotherhood, and interdependence (Himes 
1994: 94-96, 105). They need to disagree with Miller‟s arguably lower prudence 
view that, as Rwandans, Bosnians, Somalis, Liberians, Haitians, and Kosovars 
have their own cultural, historical, religious, and ethnic particularities, appeals 
to a global “we” falsely bid nations to deny those specifics as a basis for risking 
great dangers to themselves (Miller 2000: 24). The secular liberal case presumes 
that people of far-off lands are not just abstract problems but concrete sisters 
and brothers, whose dignity should be preserved at times, even by accepting 
vital risks on our part. Thus, the plausibility of the liberal requirement that 
soldiers risk their lives for rescuing (total) strangers depends on its willingness 
to propagate this religious, “thick” understanding of global community, in 
which strangers become fellow community members with which conceptual 
and emotional identification is possible – not fully, of course, but at least to the 
extent that more risk-taking by political leaders seems warranted. 
 
THE “ROMAN-NESS” OF THE LIBERAL INTERVENTIONIST IDEAL 
Having defended the “actively Christian” quality of the liberal intervention 
argument, I now turn to a defense of this essay‟s second argument, one 
distinguishable from yet (as will become clearer below when we touch upon the 
concept of prudence again) closely related to the first one. Thus, I argue that the 
interventionist ideal embedded in the liberal case entails a secularized version, 
a subsequent one actually, of a more basic religious tradition within a divided 
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one, distinguished and extensively reconstructed by (environmental and) 
“theological economist” Robert Nelson (1991)11. 
Although liberal theorists themselves are not very explicit in this regard, 
their case for humanitarian intervention would hardly make sense if it did not 
assume some “ideal of makeability”, that is, an optimistic belief that some kind 
of intervention practice that eliminates, or at least significantly reduces, human 
suffering could be designed. In this sense, liberal interventionism follows in the 
footsteps of the Western welfare state and development assistance, but more 
ambitiously so (cf. Achterhuis 1999: 45-50). The welfare state attempts to 
eliminate poverty within the context of domestic society. However, 
humanitarian intervention, like development assistance, means extending the 
faith in “makeability” to the whole Earth, including the complicated contexts of 
international relations and unfamiliar societies, but with the typical feature that 
“saving strangers” (cf. Wheeler 2000) is regarded (principally) possible by 
employing military force. In order to be able to demonstrate the “Roman-ness” 
of the liberal interventionist ideal, I must first turn to Nelson‟s understanding of 
the Roman and Protestant traditions and his defense of the “Roman-ness” of the 
welfare state. 
                                                          
11 As we shall see, whereas both traditions have Greek philosophical beginnings, these have 
subsequently been absorbed and embodied in Christian traditions. The labels “Roman” and 
“Protestant” remind of the theological heritage of the two traditions. The medieval Roman 
Church sustained the theology of the “Roman” tradition for several centuries. The Reformation, 
led by the “protestors” against the established, Roman Church, offered the most typical 
statement of the theology of the “Protestant” tradition. The labels chosen, Nelson stresses, 
achieve a consistency with respect to the main tenets of theological belief, even if not always 
describing well what the actual institutional churches of these names have believed in each 
historical period. Also, for Nelson, none of the thinkers he discusses (see the text below for 
major examples) exhibits all the beliefs of “his” tradition at all times (Nelson 1991: 17, 22-23, 30). 
Indeed, whereas some dispute has arisen about whether Nelson has placed all the figures in the 
right traditions (Stackhouse 1993: 377; Gordon 1993: 755-756), his approach clearly suggests that 





Menno R. Kamminga 
43 
43 
The Roman tradition rests on the conviction that there exist rationally 
grounded laws of nature and that mankind is ethically bound and practically 
motivated to follow these laws. The all-pervading idea of a cosmic-and-ethical 
system of natural law is central to Thomism, as in the Aristotelian and Stoic 
philosophies, and as again in the liberal philosophy of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment. Aristotle is the first and Aquinas (who reconstructed Aristotle‟s 
thought in conformity with Christian theology) the second great representative 
of this tradition of Western thought that achieved another high point in the 
Enlightenment with thinkers such as John Locke, Adam Smith, and Jeremy 
Bentham, and that has come to exert a dominant influence in Keynesian 
economics and twentieth-century welfarism. The Roman tradition believes that 
human reason and action may lead to progress, universal justice, and human 
equality. Whereas individual self-interest is rational and just, also a social 
obligation exists to help the poor. The role of government (politics) is to help 
create the good life. This tradition, then, is this-worldly, commonsensical, 
empirical, pragmatic, cosmopolitan, and utilitarian (Nelson 1991: 28-33). It 
typically defends political prudence (cf. Donald McCloskey in ibi.: xiii), 
although its tendency towards “higher prudence” (a concept explained in the 
former section) may be tempered by the extent to which its attitude is moderate 
and pragmatist. However, a deep understanding of the Roman tradition can 
only be acquired if the outlook of its antipole - the Protestant tradition - is taken 
into account as well. 
From Plato (“the first Protestant”) onwards, the Protestant tradition is 
deeply skeptical about human reason, which is seen as the source of illusion, 
not of human improvement. Men cannot master their fate, as they are 
frequently weak and deluded. Indeed, by its very misplaced confidence, 
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one not of advance but of retrogression: man‟s decline from harmony, 
contentment, and well-being to maladies such as war, selfishness, and jealousy. 
Human action and the use of human reason will not move mankind toward 
realization of the ultimate goal, as people lack this capacity within themselves. 
Hope for humanity‟s progress must be found instead in an autonomous force 
outside human influences, such as divine intervention or an impersonal law of 
history. Progress requires a basic transformation in the quality of human 
existence: the making of a whole new man. It is impossible to perfect mankind‟s 
current state, because men have become too corrupted and sinful to offer a 
satisfactory foundation of gradual improvement. Alienated from their true 
reason and nature, men have fallen into a trap in which they must hope for 
divine or other outside mercy and so wait for revelation. For Augustine, Luther, 
but also Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, alienation is the core element of the 
human condition. The Protestant tradition sees the task of government as one of 
coercively controlling sin and unruly natures, not one of eliminating poverty or 
creating justice. It is other-worldly, anti-cosmopolitan, communalist, 
pessimistic, and negative about interventionism and its consequences (ibi.: 49-
59). Insofar as it values political prudence at all and does not practically leave 
politics at the mercy of secular realists (Luther, Karl Barth), it will defend lower 
“prudence” (Niebuhr; explained in the former section) at most12. 
                                                          
12 Nelson himself does not (explicitly) include Karl Barth and Reinhold Niebuhr, and so 
overlooks the (divergent) contributions of these two highly influential Protestant thinkers. A 
typical Protestant, Barth insisted that political and social evils are the necessary product of 
man‟s sinful nature and that human effort to eradicate them is futile (Carr 2001: 94). As Carr 
notes, whereas a view such as Barth‟s, like that of Luther‟s, is basically different from that of the 
realist who makes morality a function of politics, in the field of politics it tends to become 
indistinguishable from secular realism (and its distorted view of prudence) (ibidem). Niebuhr 
defended an Augustine-inspired political ethics, strongly emphasizing the overall presence of 
sin in both situations of injustice and attempts to pursue justice. While Niebuhr upheld a certain 
Roman reason-based, pragmatic optimism about the human political obligation to work 
actively for justice and progressive social causes (cf. Berg 2007), his basic outlook was 
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Nelson himself argues – quite compellingly, considering his well-
organized and well-researched work (Barkley 1992; Stackhouse 1993; cf. Gordon 
1993) – that the modern age has channeled the exchange between the two basic, 
Roman and Protestant, ways of thinking into new, secular forms, but also that 
the optimistic Roman tradition has been the most influential in shaping 
economic thought and practice. Post-Enlightenment history witnesses a 
widespread belief - whether or not confessed aloud - that economic progress 
will eventually solve both the practical and spiritual problems of mankind. For 
many modern people, the possibility to eradicate evil from the world is no 
longer reserved to a divine power; it is mainly a matter of eliminating economic 
scarcity. The credo of contemporary “economic theology”, then, is that if all 
important human material needs can and will be satisfied, the most important 
cause of war and other forms of human hostility will belong to the past. It is 
modern economics (with its practitioners as the high priests of the economic 
religion) which will establish “heaven on Earth”. Thus, the twentieth-century 
welfare state can be regarded as the most important modern embodiment of 
this Roman faith (Nelson 1991). 
I now offer a four-step defense of the argument that the “secular” liberal 
intervention ideal has religious roots in the Roman tradition. First, Nelson‟s 
“double tradition” perspective is arguably relevant to International Relations 
and its very debate about humanitarian intervention (not just to economics) - 
with the ideal of non-intervention as unambiguously rooted in Protestant 
Christianity (Philpott 2000) and the contradicting liberal interventionist ideal as 
at least likely (at this early stage of my argument) grounded in Roman 
Christianity. Daniel Philpott has shown that the modern system of sovereign 
states, with its revolutionary norm of non-intervention, has deep religious 




Menno R. Kamminga 
46 
46 
(ibi.: 206, 240). He states that the Protestant need for security and protection 
against the enforcement efforts of the Holy Roman Emperor – which opposed 
sovereignty of states – encouraged them to give the temporal power in the 
hands of state rulers. While none of the early Reformers explicitly took up the 
concept of sovereignty (French philosopher Jean Bodin was the first to do so 
systematically, in 1576), by offering a theological justification for local political 
and ecclesiastical autonomy they laid the foundations for the theoretical 
development and political manifestation of modern sovereignty (Carlson and 
Owens 2003: 16)13. Thus, Philpott‟s argument explains the presence of the 
communalist and anti-interventionist features of the Protestant tradition in the 
international sphere. And whereas Protestantism is narrowly linked to the 
Westphalian system of sovereign states, the opposing, Roman tradition is 
broadly incompatible with the modern state and is more European (cf., e.g., 
Belloc 1931: 41-58), even cosmopolitan (cf. also Nelson 1991: 56). All this 
suggests a first reason for thinking that liberal interventionism springs from the 
boundary-transcending Roman tradition. 
Second, as an heir of the Enlightenment, and in the wake of the Western 
welfare state, liberal interventionism clearly exhibits core Roman features and 
its optimistic outlook. In fact, its very belief in the (principal) possibility of 
saving strangers entails a cosmopolitan extension of the makeability faith, and 
so is more Roman still. As the global domain is much more complex than the 
                                                          
13 To briefly summarize Philpott‟s argument: in separating the kingdom of the spirit and the 
kingdom of the social world – united under medieval Roman Catholicism – Reformation 
political theology essentially prescribed sovereignty; in subsequently facing armed threat from 
the emperor, the reformers found even more reason to give full sovereignty to the princes 
whose armies could protect them; and the polities that had experienced a Reformation crisis 
and were strongly influenced by (proto-)Reformation intellectual ideas and movements came to 
have an interest in a system of sovereign states (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, 
England, Denmark, Transylvania) and helped to bring about Westphalia, whereas in every 
polity that fought against a sovereign states system (Spain, Italy, Poland) the Reformation 
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domestic one, and also lacks a centralized government, it is not surprising that 
in this case the Roman influence has been mainly ideal rather than practical, 
unlike in the case of the welfare state. Liberals would find little reason to 
consider and defend humanitarian intervention if that were a common and 
successful international response to severe human rights violations. However, 
this is surely not the case. The last two decades alone have seen humanitarian 
crises in Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Haiti, and the 
Darfur region of Sudan. Many people feel anger about the failure of the United 
States and its European allies to stop the genocide in Rwanda, and their unduly 
long delay when doing so in Bosnia. However, the West only sometimes rallies 
to stop the evil, as it did in Kosovo. Yet liberals believe that their defense of 
humanitarian intervention - a characteristic appeal to human reason - may 
change this situation for the better and make their ideal more followed in 
practice. 
Third, the proposals that liberals have recently offered for 
institutionalizing their interventionist moral ideal further elucidate the typically 
Roman nature of liberal interventionism. In order to avoid the problem of not 
finding secular powers inclined to make their soldiers available for rescuing the 
lives of foreigners, various liberals want the international community to create a 
permanent, democratically accountable (smaller or larger) global rescue army 
(Archibugi 2004; Pattison 2008). The United Nations lacks an air force or navy, 
but the international community should have an army of its own. Remarkably, 
this progressivist liberal proposal culminates into the wish to move up to a 
post-Westphalian, post-sovereign, “neomedievalist” world political order (cf. 
Pogge 1994, Linklater 1998, Caney 2005). Here one may think of European 
Union-like global system, in which the holding of sovereignty is split between 
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for: “somewhat of a return to a feature of the pre-Westphalian system, in which 
the authority over a people was divided between the local rulers and the 
„universal‟ Church” (Etzioni 2009: 174). Such proposals to “reunite” the “(quasi-
)ecclesiastical” and the “secular” authorities, albeit in a modern way, are as 
Roman as can be. 
Fourth, the ideal of makeability that underlies the liberal case for 
humanitarian intervention, like any makeability ideal, is directly at odds with 
the pessimistic element in Protestant anti-interventionism, which, again, 
suggests its Roman-ness. Protestants will typically reject the liberal belief in the 
task of politics to help improve human conditions not merely at home but even 
abroad. They will presumably find liberal interventionism haughty, or at least 
naïve, as it ignores that the ultimate cause of grave humanitarian suffering is an 
inherent evil beyond the scope of politics. The Protestant tradition, then, would 
rather insist on its own ability to clarify the modest practice of humanitarian 
intervention. It may want to stress that outside powers will not intervene out of 
respect for the non-intervention norm. More to the point, the Protestant 
tradition may want to emphasize that outside powers will be pessimistically 
hesitant to intervene in strange social environments (also because the domestic 
welfare state has met disillusion recently for having led to alienation and 
apathy), and will not want to risk the lives of its soldiers for uncertain 
humanitarian rescue operations. And even if the Protestant skeptical attitude 
towards liberals who think that the makeability ideal can be applied outside the 
domestic sphere - by warfare even - would not have the significant practical 
force it seems to have, Protestants would insist that this is the way in which 
outside powers should behave. The Protestant view may find confirmation in 
the dubious, if not bad, consequences of the 1999 Kosovo intervention (cf. 
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needed for carrying out humanitarian interventions whenever called for, 
Protestants will warn for the risk that such a system of crisscrossing loyalties 
will end up more violent than the present sovereign states system (cf. Bull 2002: 
246, 275). Put differently, they will warn for the dangers of a global, “second 
counter-Reformation”. However, indeed, to think that such caution is 
misplaced is typical of the optimistic Roman tradition. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As the concept of high prudence has Roman roots yet is not pragmatist, the 
arguments advanced above, taken together, suggest that the liberal political 
theory of humanitarian intervention must assume a religious dimension that 
may well be called “progressivistically Roman”. Liberal advocates of 
humanitarian intervention policy should study religion in order to understand 
their own position and the rootedness of their presumed secular outlook in 
religious worldviews. How can we explain that liberals themselves do not seem 
aware of this? This, I would suggest, has to do with one major shift that secular 
liberalism (along, though, with contemporary Catholic and Protestant social 
teaching) has pursued within the Western religious tradition: a departure from 
the traditional emphasis on authority (whose responsibility it is to decide) 
(Johnson 2003). Thus, secular just war thought features the prioritization of just 
cause among the moral criteria to be satisfied for resort to armed force (see 
notably Walzer 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2006), including humanitarian intervention, 
thereby reducing the requirement of sovereign authority to (at best) a 
secondary, supporting role (such authority is to act in response to the 
establishment of just cause). By contrast, both the Roman Aquinas and the 
Protestant Luther clearly gave priority to the political-ethical requirement of 
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ensuring a peaceful (global) order. It is the sovereign, in deciding whether to 
resort to armed force (as the one who is in a position to judge whether a just 
cause exists or not in a given case), who must make sure to satisfy the other 
moral requirements of jus ad bellum (Johnson 2003). 
Yet, if today we demand that states take their sovereignty to entail the 
responsibility to protect their populations, we somewhat return to the views of 
Aquinas and Luther, which both emphasized the sovereign‟s responsibility to 
serve the common good of the political community over which the person in 
authority is sovereign. Indeed, it is from a political-ethical perspective largely 
rooted in (neo)medieval and early modern beliefs that leaders such as former 
Yugoslavian president Milosevic or former Libyan president Gadaffi appear not 
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